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NOTES
SECTION 17(a) OF THE '33 ACT: DEFINING THE
SCOPE OF ANTIFRAUD PROTECTION
A. United States v. Naftalin
Congress enacted the federal securities laws1 to protect the public
against fraudulent practices in the securities markets.2 Several sections of
these laws expressly permit private enforcement.$ Some sections, how-
ever, allow the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and de-
frauded investors to prosecute securities violations thereunder." Addition-
ally, certain sections of federal securities laws require proof of scienter to
establish a violation,5 while some provisions proscribe merely negligent
conduct.' Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act)7 neither
See, e.g., the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976) ('33 Act); the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1976)('34 Act); the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z (1976); the Investment Company Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 52 (1976); the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to
21 (1976) (Advisors Act).
2 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1940); H.R. REP. No. 1388, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933); S. REP. No. 1775,
76th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1940); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong, 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934). Courts and
commentators agree that the various federal securities laws attempt to protect investors
from fraud by promoting high standards of business ethics in the securities industry. See,
e.g., Transamerica Mortg. Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 14-15 (1979) (Advisers Act
protects investors from fraud in investment advisers industry); accord, Wilson v. First
Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1240 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S.
768, 772 (1979) (purpose of '33 Act to protect investors and securities market operations
from fraud); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ('34 Act prohibits fraud-
ulent practices in securities industry to protect investors). See generally, Douglas & Bates,
The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Douglas &
Bates]; Landis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 214 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Landis].
3 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o (1976); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78p, 78r, 78t (1976).
4 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78n(a) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976).
5 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a), 78t (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
4 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (1976) (§ 11(b)(3) (B) of '33 Act establishes negli-
gence standard for liability of experts for misleading statements in registration statement);
15 U.S.C. § 771 (2) (1976) (§ 12(2) of '33 Act embodies negligence standard for misstate-
ments and omissions). Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976) (§ 11(a) of '33 Act establishes liability
without fault for misstatements in registration statement).
7 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). Section 17(a) of the '33 Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
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explicitly confers a private right of action nor states the requisite degree
of culpability necessary to recover if implied private rights exist under
section 17(a). s Nevertheless, recent Supreme Court cases illustrate judi-
cial expansion of the government's ability to enforce antifraud provisions
by broadening the scope of section 17(a) and limiting private rights of
action under the '33 Act.
9
The '33 Act10 regulates distribution of securities and seeks to protect
the investing public against securities fraud.1 In order to enforce these
objectives, section 17(a) of the '33 Act generally prohibits fraud and mis-
representation in the offer or sale of securities. 2 Antifraud protection
under section 17(a), however, does not specifically extend to persons act-
ing as agents for purchasers. The Supreme Court, in United States v.
Naftalin,3 recently examined whether section 17(a) protects agents en-
gaged in ordinary market trading for investors against fraudulent
schemes.
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id.
8 See note 7 supra.
See text accompanying notes 24-52 and 83-94 infra.
'0 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
" See Kaplan, Statutory Framework of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, INTRODUCTION TO SECURITIES REGULATION 13 (PLI 1979); Note, Scien-
ter and SEC Injunctive Actions Under Securities Act Section 17(a), 63 IowA L. Rxv. 1248,
1260 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Scienter and Section 17(a)]. The '33 Act was the first
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for the distribution of securities. See generally
Douglas & Bates, supra note 2; see also Landis, supra note 2. Distribution is the process by
which securities are transferred from the issuer to the investing public. Primary distribution
occurs by issuing the securities by a direct placement or through an underwriter. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 77b(4), 77b(11) (1976) (respective definitions of "issuer" and "underwriter"). A
secondary offering is a two-step process whereby an investor who has acquired a substantial
block of securities from the issuer sells the securities to another investor. See, e.g., United
States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1968); In re Ira Haupt
& Co., 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946). In contrast to distribution, securities trading encompasses se-
curities transactions on the open market effected through a broker, on an exchange, or oth-
erwise. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1976). Although the '34 Act originally was geared to national
securities exchanges, Congress amended the '34 Act to cover over-the-counter markets as
well. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (g) (1976).
Concommitant with regulating the distribution process, the '33 Act seeks to assure the
availability of adequate reliable information about securities offerings by requiring registra-
tion of the securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). Certain securities and transactions are exempt
from the registration requirement. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (1976). A registration state-
ment, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), contains certain required
information sufficient to enable a potential investor to make an informed assessment of a
security prior to purchase. 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1976).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
13 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
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Naftalin arose as a result of a criminal prosecution involving a viola-
tion of section 17(a)(1) of the '33 Act.14 Naftalin, the president of a bro-
ker-dealer firm, engaged in a fraudulent short-selling scheme by falsely
representing that he owned the stocks he wished to sell.15 Naftalin se-
lected several securities that, in his estimation, had peaked in price and
were about to decline.1 6 Under the pretense of owning the stocks, Nafta-
lin placed sell orders with five brokers, intending to make off-setting
stock purchases at lower prices.1 7 The market price rose sharply, however,
preventing Naftalin from making delivery and forcing the brokers to buy
replacement shares at a higher price."'
The Department of Justice indicted Naftalin on eight counts of securi-
ties fraud under section 17(a).1 9 At trial, the district court imposed crimi-
nal liability on Naftalin pursuant to section 24 for willfully employing a
scheme and artifice to defraud in the sale of securities in violation of sec-
tion 17(a)(1). 20 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction
despite finding that Naftalin had engaged in a fraudulent scheme.2 The
court held that the government must prove some impact of the scheme on
investors, as opposed to agent-brokers, to establish a section 17(a)(1) vio-
lation.2 2 The court reasoned that the purpose of the '33 Act was limited to
14 Section 24 of the '33 Act provides criminal sanctions for willful violations of any
provision of the '33 Act or of any rules or regulations promulgated by the SEC therein. 15
U.S.C. § 77x (1976).
15 441 U.S. at 770. Shortselling is a device whereby an investor sells stock he does not
own in anticipation of a decline in that stock's market price. The speculator hopes to make
delivery by purchasing the stock at the lower price, thereby realizing as profit the difference
between the sales price and the lesser purchase price. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1934);
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-3 (1979) (definition of "short-sale"). See generally 2 L. Loss, SEcurrIEs
REGULATION 1224-35 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. Short selling is lawful unless
made in contravention of SEC rules. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1
(1979). The SEC requires brokers and dealers to mark all sell orders either "short" or
"long" prior to trading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1(c) (1979). In order to mark a sell order "long,"
a broker-dealer must be informed that the security to be delivered after sale is carried in the
account for which the sale is to be effected and that the seller owns the security and will
deliver the security as soon as possible. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-l(d) (1979); see note 17 infra.
I' 441 U.S. at 770.
17 Id. By lying about his ownership of the securities, Naftalin fraudulently induced the
five brokers to mark the sell orders "long." Id.; see note 15 supra. Naftalin was familiar with
securities trading and knew that, had he been truthful, the brokers would have rejected his
sell orders or required a margin deposit. Id.
is Id. Execution of a sell order marked "long" incurs potential liability on behalf of a
broker because he must assure delivery of the securities. If the seller fails to deliver the
securities when due, the broker must "buy-in" substitute shares for the purchasers under
some circumstances. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-2(a) (1979); text accompanying notes 38-41
infra.
" See United States v. Naftalin, 579 F.2d 444, 445 (8th Cir. 1978); notes 14 & 18 supra.
2: 579 F.2d at 445.
Id. at 447.
2, Id. The Eighth Circuit observed that Naftalin might be the first case that the gov-
ernment prosecuted solely under § 17(a)(1) in which the principal fraud was perpetrated
1980]
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protecting investors from fraudulent securities practices. The Supreme
Court, reversing the Eighth Circuit, held that section 17(a) prohibits
frauds against brokers and investors in an offer or sale of securities ef-
fected in the distribution process or in ordinary market trading.
2
The Supreme Court first addressed the threshold question whether
section 17(a) applies to frauds occurring in the aftermarket.24 Naftalin
contended that the '33 Act regulates only initial offerings.2 5 Since the
fraudulent short sales did not involve a new offering, Naftalin argued that
the Court could not apply section 17(a) to his case.26 Rejecting Naftalin's
claim, the Court stated for the first time that, despite the '33 Act's regu-
lation of public distributions and initial offerings, section 17(a) prohibits
fraudulent practices in offers and sales without regard to the particular
phase of the selling transaction. 27 The Naftalin Court observed that the
language of section 17(a) makes no distinction between transactions in
public distributions or in aftermarket trading.2 8 In addition, the Court's
examination of the legislative history of the Act demonstrated that Con-
gress intended section 17(a) to be a major departure from the '33 Act's
primary concern with public distributions. 29 The Supreme Court con-
cluded that section 17(a) protects the investing public from fraud in the
offer or sale of new and old outstanding stock issues.30
upon brokers rather than investors. Id. at 448. Although § 10(b) of the '34 Act also prohibits
fraudulent schemes, see note 30 infra, the government declined to prosecute under § 10(b).
The scope of § 10(b) clearly covers frauds against investors. See A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,
375 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1967) (stockbroker civil action for damages against investor up-
held under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). In civil and criminal proceedings, § 10(b) applies to
fraudulent short-selling schemes, regardless of any effect on the investor. See United States
v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971).
23 441 U.S. at 771-72.
2, 441 U.S. at 777-78. Aftermarket trading refers to ordinary market trading of a secur-
ity after the public offering of a security. See note 11 supra.
25 441 U.S. at 777-78. Several legal commentators interpret the scope of § 17(a) as lim-
ited to frauds occurring solely in the initial distribution of securities. See, e.g., Hazen, A
Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Secur-
ities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REv. 641, 645 & 657-58 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hazen];
Landis, supra note 2, at 46; Note, Nonpurchaser Plaintiff Given Standing To Bring An
Action Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933: Another Threat To the Birn-
baum Doctrine, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 912, 921-22 (1978).
26 441 U.S. at 777-78. Naftalin, admitting his guilt, contended that prosecution under §
17(a) was improper. Id. at 772. Naftalin's fraudulent scheme clearly violates the specific
short-selling regulations under the '34 Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 78j(a) (1976); 12 C.F.R. §§
220.3, 220.4(c)(ii), 220.8(d), 224.2 (1979); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (1979), and the '34 Act's
general antifraud proscriptions, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
27 441 U.S. at 771-74.
28 441 U.S. at 777-78; see 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); note 12 supra.
" 441 U.S. at 777-78; see 1 Loss, supra note 15, at 130; Douglas & Bates, supra note 2,
at 182; V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 740 (1972). The Senate Report
reveals that the '33 Act "subjects the sale of old ... securities to the same criminal penal-
ties and injunctive authority for fraud, deception, or misrepresentation as in the case of new
issues ...... S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933).
30 441 U.S. at 777-78; see note 29 supra.
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Having determined the applicability of section 17(a) to the Naftalin
case, the Court turned to Naftalin's assertion that section 17(a)(1) applies
solely to frauds directed against investor-purchasers.3 1 The Court refuted
Naftalin's claim by analyzing the language of section 17(a)(1) and the leg-
islative history behind the '33 Act.3 2 The Supreme Court observed that
nothing on the face of the statute requires a plaintiff to reach investor
status in order to avail himself of section 17(a) remedies.33 Furthermore,
the Court determined that each subsection of section 17(a) proscribes a
distinct category of misconduct.3 The language "upon the purchaser"
found in section 17(a)(3) is, therefore, inapplicable to subsection (a)(1).3 5
The Naftalin Court also considered whether the language of section 17(a)
requires that fraud occur in a particular phase of the selling transaction. 6
Interpreting "offer" and "sale," the Court concluded that the scope of
section 17(a) encompasses transactions in all phases of the selling process,
including broker-customer dealings.3 7 The Supreme Court substantiated
its readings of the statute by comparing the "in the offer or sale" lan-
guage of section 17(a) to the "in connection with" language found in sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act). 8 Recognizing
3' 441 U.S. at 771.
" Id. at 771-74.
3 Id. at 772; see note 7 supra.
" 441 U.S. at 773-74. Naftalin contended that the phrase "upon the purchaser" found
in § 17(a)(3), see note 4 supra, applies to all three subsections. The Supreme Court flatly
rejected this contention based upon the language and structure of the statute. The Court
observed that the phrase "upon the purchaser" is a part of subsection (3) alone. Id. Further-
more, the use of an infinitive and separate numbers to introduce each subsection create
distinct categories of proscribed conduct. Id. at 774 n.5. Recognizing that structure and
punctuation alone do not decide the meaning of a statute, id., see Costanzo v. Tillinghast,
287 U.S. 341, 344 (1932), the Supreme Court emphasized that the composition of § 17(a)
confirmed the conclusion that each successive prohibition covers additional types of illegal
conduct. 441 U.S. at 773-74; see Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 After
Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEO. L.J. 163, 168 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Steinberg].
"441 U.S. at 773-74.
"Id. at 772-73.
37 Id. Section 2(3) of the '33 Act provides that "[t]he term 'sale'... shall include every
contract of sale or disposition of a security, or interest in a security, for value. The term...
'offer' shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of... a security or interest in a secur-
ity, for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976).
Congress expressly intended to define the terms "offer" and "sale" broadly in order to
advance the regulatory purpose of the '33 Act and its antifraud provisions. Id.; see 441 U.S.
at 772-73; H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933); 1 Loss, supra note 15, at 512
n.163.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1976). Section 10(b) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976),
prohibits the use or employment of any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
the offer or sale of any security. Id. Naftalin asserted that the difference between "in" and
"in connection with" constitutes a significant distinction between the scope of § 17(a) and §
10(b). 441 U.S. at 772 n.4. Therefore, Naftalin contended that "in the offer or sale of securi-
ties" under § 17(a) connotes a narrower range of activities than the language of § 10(b). Id.
The linguistic discrepancy between the two sections prompted the government to allow that
the phrase "in connection with" may indicate a looser relationship to the securities industry
than the term "in." Brief for the United States at 15 n.12, United States v. Naftalin, 441
19801
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that the Court and Congress frequently use these terms interchangeably,
the Naftalin Court refused to interpret "in" as encompassing more lim-
ited activities than "in connection with" the offer or sale of securities. s9
Since Naftalin's sell orders resulted in sales, the Court held that the
fraudulent scheme violated section 17(a)(1) of the '33 Act.
4 0
In support of a broad interpretation of section 17(a), the Supreme
Court examined the legislative history of the '33 Act to determine that
Act's purpose and scope.4 1 Rejecting the Eighth Circuit's restrictive inter-
pretation of the Act's purpose,'4 2 the Court maintained that Congress in-
tended not only to protect investors but also to enforce ethical business
practices throughout the securities industry.43 Additionally, the Court
emphasized that the interests of investors and financial intermediaries
are interrelated.4 Frauds against either group may ultimately injure the
other as well as the national economy.4" As a result of the brokers' obliga-
tion to buy substitute stocks, the Naftalin investors suffered no direct
financial injury.46 The Court recognized, however, that frauds perpetrated
against brokers may have substantial indirect effects on investors. 7 In
view of the possible harm that fraudulent schemes can cause, the Su-
U.S. at 768.
39 441 U.S. at 772 n.4. The Supreme Court acknowledged using the terms "in" and "in
connection with" interchangeably prior to Naftalin. Id., see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bank-
ers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971). The Court recognized similar interchangeable use
on the part of Congress. 441 U.S. at 772 n.4; see H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Seas. 6
(1933). The "in" language of § 17(a) may now cover as broad a range of transactions as the
"in connection with" language of § 10(b) of the '34 Act. See Steinberg, supra note 34, at
171.
40 441 U.S. at 771.
41 Id. at 774-78.
42 Id. at 774-77. The Eighth Circuit determined that Congress enacted the '33 Act to
protect investors from fraudulent practices in the sale of securities. 579 F.2d 444, 447 (8th
Cir. 1978). Thus, interpreting the scope of the Act narrowly, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that § 17(a) antifraud protection extended only to investors. Id. at 448; see text accompany-
ing note 22 supra.
43 441 U.S. at 775; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ('33 and
'34 Acts protect investors from fraud and promote ethical business standards); accord, SEC
v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963).
44 441 U.S. at 776-77. The Court recognized that frauds perpetrated against brokers
have an indirect impact on investors. Id.; see text accompanying note 4 supra.
" 441 U.S. at 776-77; see note 18 supra.
46 441 U.S. at 776-77.
47 Id. Losses suffered by brokers increase operational costs. Investors bear the burden
of increased costs through higher brokerage fees. Id. Furthermore, unchecked fraudulent
short sales through brokers operate to the detriment of investors and the economy by artifi-
cially increasing the uncertainty of the securities market. The investors in Naftalin suffered
no immediate financial injury because the brokers were able to "buy in." See text accompa-
nying note 18 supra. If brokers are not able to buy in, however, investors fail to receive
anticipated shares or must pay a higher price for substitute shares. 441 U.S. at 776-77. Indi-
rect injury to investors remains possible despite reduction of the potential for direct losses
under "buy in" regulations. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-2 (1978). See generally Securities Inves-
tor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1976).
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preme Court concluded that section 17(a) of the '33 Act protects individ-
ual investors and the sanctity of market mechanisms.
48
The Naftalin decision significantly expands the class of persons enti-
tled to receive antifraud protection. According to the statutory construc-
tion of the Naftalin Court, the protections afforded by subsections (1)
and (2) of section 17(a) are not restricted to actual purchasers or inves-
tors.49 Financial intermediaries form an integral part of the operation of
the securities market and, therefore, rightfully deserve SEC protection
from fraudulent conduct.5 0 Had the Supreme Court held otherwise, bro-
kers would bear all losses caused by frauds not affecting investors. The
Naftalin Court, however, refused to create a loophole in the Act for dis-
honest conduct by excluding brokers from the antifraud protection of sec-
tion 17(a). Although narrowing the reach of section 17(a) would have
been in accordance with recent restrictions on civil remedies under fed-
eral securities laws,51 the Court chose to widen the scope of section 17(a)
to include aftermarket frauds.52 Clearly, the Naftalin Court is expanding
the antifraud protection under section 17(a) to facilitate government en-
forcement of the purpose of the '33 Act.
48 441 U.S. at 771-77.
4, See text accompanying notes 23-34 supra.
50 441 U.S. at 776-77; see Steinberg, supra note 34, at 170.
51 See, e.g., Transamerica Mortg. Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 21 (1979) (limited
private remedy implied only under § 215 of Advisers Act); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (no implied private right of action for damages under § 17(a) of the
'34 Act); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 563 (1979) (interest in
noncontributory, compulsory pension plan not "security," and thus not subject to regulation
under Securities Acts); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (breach of
fiduciary duty, without fraud, deception or misrepresentation not actionable under § 10(b)
of the '34 Act and Rule 10b-5); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 37-41 (1977)
(defeated tender offeror has no standing to bring implied private right of action for damages
under § 14(e) of the '34 Act); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (scienter
required in private damage actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (only purchasers and sellers have standing to
bring implied private cause of action for damages under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5). See gener-
ally, Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfels].
52 441 U.S. at 771-74. The Naftalin Court's decision to extend antifraud protection to
brokers is not without precedent. See United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336, 338-39 (2d Cir.
1977). In Brown, the court indicated that the criminal provisions of § 17(a) of the '33 Act
apply even when the ultimate purchaser of securities has not been injured or defrauded. Id.
Unlike Naftalin, however, Brown involved a scheme that defrauded investors as well as
brokers. Prior to Brown, the Second Circuit extended the reach of § 17(a) to protect de-
frauded bond lenders. United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 467 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 936 (1976). Significantly, both Brown and Gentile involved transactions in aftermarket
trading, instead of offers or sales in the course of an initial distribution. 555 F.2d at 338-39;
530 F.2d at 464; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). In Hochfelder,
the Court asserted that Congress enacted the '33 Act to provide investors with full disclo-
sure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to pro-
tect investors against fraud, and to promote high ethical standards of honesty and fair deal-
ing. Id. Including brokers within the auspices of § 17(a) is, therefore, consistent with the
Supreme Court's earlier interpretation of the regulatory scheme embodied by the '33 Act.
1980]
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B. Implied Private Rights of Action Under Section 17(a)
Although courts recognize implied private rights of action under cer-
tain sections of the federal securities laws,53 the Supreme Court recently
has been reluctant to extend relief to private parties under securities stat-
utes." In recent years, the Court has tightened standing requirements
under securities statutes that afford private causes of action, thereby lim-
iting the class of private parties eligible for relief.55 Section 17(a) of the
'33 Act, however, does not expressly confer a private right of action upon
defrauded investors.56 Court decisions are presently in conflict over
whether section 17(a) embodies private rights of action.57 The Supreme
Court decision in Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis,58 how-
ever, signals an end to the controversy over private rights under section
17(a).59 Evincing a conservative attitude towards implication issues, the
Transamerica Court restricted and modified the once-definitive standard
announced in Cort v. Ash" for determining whether implied private
63 See note 3 supra.
See generally Lowenfels, supra note 51; 1978-1979 Securities Law Developments, 36
WASH. & LEa L. Rxv. 757, 859-67 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1978-1979 Securities
Developments].
' See note 51 supra.
See note 7 supra.
7 Several courts have expressly or impliedly recognized private rights of action under §
17(a). See, e.g., Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979);
Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97,
99 (4th Cir. 1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973); Kellman v.
ICS, Inc., 447 F.2d 1305, 1308 (6th Cir. 1971). These courts, however, imply private rights
based upon a parallel implied remedy under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the '34 Act, rather
than statutory construction. Many of these courts maintain that there is little practical
point in denying private rights under § 17(a) since private rights exist under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly,
J., concurring). Few courts that support implication apply the test suggested by Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975). See, e.g., Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275, 278-81 (D.
Alaska 1979); note 61 infra. Courts that deny private rights under § 17(a) examine the lan-
guage, legislative history and purpose of § 17(a). See, e.g., Gunter v. Hutcheson, 433 F.
Supp. 42, 45 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Reid v. Mann, 381 F. Supp. 525, 526-28 (N.D. Ill. 1974);
Hardy v. Sanson, 356 F. Supp. 1034, 1038 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Dyer v. Eastern Trust and Bank-
ing Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 903-05 (D. Me. 1971); see text accompanying notes 62-65 infra.
Some courts recognize implied rights only under §§ 17(a)(1) and (3), see Wulc v. Gulf &
Western Indus., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 99, 103 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp.,
336 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1972), while other courts recognize private rights under §
17(a)(2) only if the plaintiff meets the requirements of § 12(2) of the '33 Act, see Greater
Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 790 (8th Cir. 1967); In re Falstaff Brewing Corp.
Antitrust Litigation, 441 F. Supp. 62, 67 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
-444 U.S. 11 (1979).
5, See text accompanying notes 95-138 infra.
'0 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, the Supreme Court faced the issue whether a private
party could sue an alleged violator of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). Id. at 70-
71. The FECA prohibits corporations from making contributions to federal elections. See 2
U.S.C. § 441b (1976). The plaintiff brought suit against Bethlehem Steel Corp. and its direc-
tors for financially supporting political advertisements in the 1972 presidential election. De-
spite the absence of an express private remedy, the plaintiff sought damages and injunctive
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rights exist under a federal statute. 1
The Cort decision created a four-prong implication test for courts to
apply to statutes affording no private remedy. 2 The court, under the first
prong, must ascertain whether the plaintiff is a member of the class that
benefits specially from the protection offered by the statute.6 3 According
to the second Cort factor, the court must examine the legislative history
of the statute to determine whether Congress explicitly or implicitly in-
tended to create or to deny a private cause of action under the statute."
The third Cort inquiry requires the court to decide whether an implied
private right is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative
scheme.6 5 Finally, the court must determine if the cause of action is one
traditionally relegated to state law.
66
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,67 the Supreme Court modified the
Cort test and reaffirmed its restrictive posture toward implied private
rights of action under federal securities laws.' The Redington Court ob-
relief as a shareholder of Bethlehem. 422 U.S. at 70-72.
61 See 444 U.S. 11, 15-24; text accompanying notes 84-94 infra. The Supreme Court
employed the Cort test in several cases presenting the issue of implied rights under various
federal statutes. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-74 (1979) (Cort
implication analysis applied to § 17 of '34 Act); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 689-709 (1979) (application of Cort implication test to title IX of Education Amend-
ments to Civil Rights Act of 1964); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 34-41 (1977)
(Cort implication test applied to § 44(e) of '34 Act).
In Cannon, the Supreme Court recognized private rights under Title IX. 441 U.S. at
689; see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976). The Supreme Court denied private rights, however, in
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577-79; see 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976), and in Piper, 430 U.S. at 39; see
15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976). Piper was the first case in which the Supreme Court applied the
Cort test to a federal security statute. See 1978-1979 Securities Developments, supra note
54, at 947-48. The Redington decision, however, did not apply the Cort test in its original
form. See 442 U.S. at 757; text accompanying notes 67-74 infra.
62 See 422 U.S. at 78. The Court delineated four issues relevant to a determination
whether a federal statute creates an implied private right of action. Id.; see text accompany-
ing notes 63-66 infra.
63 422 U.S. at 78; see Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
"422 U.S. at 78; see National R.R. Pass. Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass., 414
U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
" 422 U.S. at 78; see Securities Inv. Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423
(1975); National R.R. Pass. Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass., 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
"422 U.S. at 78.
67 442 U.S. at 560 (1979). Redington arose from the insolvency and liquidation of Weis
Securities, Inc. Id. at 563-66. Plaintiff Redington brought suit as trustee in liquidation to
recover damages on behalf of the Weis firm and its customers from the defendant account-
ing firm, Touche Ross. Id. at 565. Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC) joined Red-
ington in the action and asserted derivative claims as insurer of Weis' customers. Id. The
plaintiffs alleged that Touche Ross prepared and certified false and misleading financial
statements in violation of § 17(a) of the '34 Act. Id. at 565-66; see 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976)
(requiring accounting and administrative reports from securities brokers and dealers). The
plaintiffs asserted that an implied private right of action exists under section 17(a) and
demanded recovery of damages for these violations. Id. at 566; see Steinberg, supra note 34,
at 173-75; 1978-1979 Securities Developments, supra note 54, at 948-53.
"See 442 U.S. at 568-74; text accompanying notes 70-71 infra. The Supreme Court
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served that examination of the language, legislative history, and purpose
of a statute are the proper means for resolving the implication issue. 9
Since the first three criteria of the Cort standard are the traditional indi-
cia of legislative intent, the Redington Court placed special emphasis on
these factors.70 If these three inquiries remain unsatisfied, the Redington
Court held that courts need not determine whether an implied private
right is a cause of action traditionally relegated to state law.7 1 In denying
private rights under section 17(a) of the '34 Act,72 the Court indicated for
the first time that the four elements of the Cort test do not deserve equal
weight.73 The Redington Court concluded that the central inquiry is
whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action.74
The Transamerica Court narrowed the focus of the Cort implication
analysis.7 5 In Transamerica, plaintiff Lewis alleged that the defendants,
in advising and managing the Mortgage Trust of America, committed
frauds and breaches of fiduciary duties in violation of sections 206 and
215 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act).7 6 Section 215
acknowledged that earlier implication cases adhered to an expansive remedial doctrine in
favor of implied private rights. Id. at 578; see, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 429-
30 (1964). The Redington Court recognized that recent cases applied a stricter standard for
the implication of private rights, see, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
690-93 (1979); Securities Inv. Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 424 (1975), and
expressly adopted this conservative approach. 442 U.S. at 577.
69 Id. at 568-74. The Redington Court, in order to discern congressional purpose, ex-
amined the language of § 17 of the '34 Act in light of the first Cort factor. Id. at 568-71. The
Court observed that the ultimate beneficiaries of § 17 are the investing public since § 17
failed to proscribe certain conduct or to confer federal rights on the plaintiff as a broker's
customer. Id. at 570-71. Addressing the second Cort factor, the Court determined that the
brief legislative history of § 17(a) did not support implication of a private right. Id. at 571
n.11. The Redington Court, in accordance with the third Cort element, examined the legisla-
tive scheme of the '34 Act. Id. at 571. The Court recognized that implied rights under §
17(a) were inconsistent with the framework of the '34 Act. Id. at 571-74. Since these criteria
militated against implication, the Redington Court denied private rights under § 17(a) with-
out further inquiry. Id. at 574.
70 Id. The Redington Court observed that the judiciary should not imply a private rem-
edy without adequate evidence of congressional intent to confer that private right. Id. To do
otherwise, the Court reasoned, would infringe upon the legislative power of Congress. Id. at
577-79. The Redington Court invited Congress to provide a federal damage remedy under §
17(a). Id.
71 Id. at 574. Redington emphasized that the implication issue is essentially a matter of
statutory construction. Id. at 568. Accordingly, the Redington Court limited its inquiry to
the language of § 17(a) and the congressional intent behind that section. Id. at 568-578. In
the absence of congressional intent to provide a private right, Redington refused to consider
the final Cort factor. Id. at 575-77.
72 Id. at 575-78.
73 See id. at 575-76; 1978-1979 Securities Developments, supra note 54, at 950-953.
7" 442 U.S. at 575-77; see note 70 supra.
76 444 U.S. at 23-24; see text accompanying notes 83-94 infra.
76 444 U.S. at 12-13. Lewis, a shareholder of Mortgage Trust of America (Trust),
brought suit as a derivative action on behalf of the Trust and as a class action on behalf of
the Trust's shareholders. Id. at 13. The defendants were the Trust, Transamerica Mortgage
Advisers, Inc. (TAMA), several individual trustees and two affiliated corporations (Land
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of the Advisers Act voids certain advisory contracts. 7 Section 206, how-
ever, simply proscribes certain conduct and establishes federal fiduciary
duties of investment advisers.78 Plaintiff Lewis asserted that an implied
right of action exists under both sections,79 and sought equitable relief
from a void advisory contract and recovery of damages for violations of
fiduciary obligations.80 Adhering to the Cort analysis as modified by Red-
ington,81 the Supreme Court implied a private cause of action under sec-
tion 215, but refused to accept the plaintiff's implication claim under sec-
tion 206.82
The Supreme Court premised its analysis of the implication issues in
Transamerica upon basic statutory construction."s Echoing Redington,
the Court emphasized that the appropriate inquiry is whether Congress
intended to create the private cause of action asserted.8' Accordingly, the
Transamerica Court selected the second Cort factor as the initial inquiry
under its implication analysis.8 5 The Court reorganized the second prong
of the Cort test to include examination of statutory language and legisla-
tive history.86 If neither language nor legislative sources reveal congres-
Capital and Transamerica). Id. Plaintiff Lewis asserted three causes of action allegedly aris-
ing under the Advisers Act. Id. at 13-14; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 21 (1976). The first cause
of action stated that the advisory contract between Trust and TAMA was illegal. 444 U.S. at
13. Lewis maintained that Transamerica and TAMA were not registered under the Advisers
Act and that the advisory contract provided for grossly excessive compensation. Id. The
complaint's second allegation contended that the defendants breached fiduciary duties to
the Trust by purchasing inferior securities on behalf of the Trust. Id. The third cause of
action asserted that the defendants misappropriated lucrative investment opportunities for
the benefit of other companies affiliated with Transamerica. Id. at 13-14.
77See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976).
71 444 U.S. at 13-15. The trial court ruled that the Advisers Act confers no private
rights and dismissed the complaint. Id. at 14. Reversing the District Court, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that implied private rights under the Advisers Act are necessary to achieve the
congressional purpose of that legislation. Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237, 239
(9th Cir. 1978).
80 444 U.S. at 14-15. The customary legal incidents of a void contract are avoidance of
the contract and restitution of consideration paid. See Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 289 (1940); S. WMLLSTON, CONMAaCrs § 1525 (3d ed. 1957). Unless a
statute expressly provides for monetary liability, however, a court must be wary of awarding
damages. See 444 U.S. at 19.
81 See text accompanying notes 68-74 supra. But see text accompanying notes 84-94
infra (modifying implication analysis premised on Cort-Redington test).
444 U.S. at 23-24.
Id. at 16; accord, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
" 444 U.S. at 16. The Transamerica Court recognized that earlier opinions emphasized
the desirability of implying private remedies to effectuate the purpose of a certain statute.
Id.; see, e.g., J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1964). Determination of congres-
sional intent, however, is the ultimate inquiry under Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 15-16, and
Redington, 442 U.S. at 568.
" See 444 U.S. at 15-17. The Transamerica Court neglected to use the "prong" termi-
nology employed by courts that apply the traditional four-prong Cort analysis. See id. at 16-
24.
" 444 U.S. at 16-22. Originally, the second Cort factor examined only the legislative
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sional intent to imply a private right of action, the inquiry ends with a
denial of private rights.8 7 The Transamerica Court reasoned that when
Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, Congress could do
so expressly.88 Once the statute satisfies the initial level of the modified
Cort test, a court must consider the third Cort factor to determine if the
implication of a private right is consistent with the purpose of the stat-
ute."' Transamerica redefines the third Cort element as a two-pronged
inquiry. This secondary level of the implication inquiry comprehends an
identification of the special class that benefits from the statute and a de-
termination whether implied private rights are necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the entire legislative scheme.9 0 Neither protection of a special
class nor statutory purpose, however, necessitates implication of private
rights without evidence of congressional directive to do so.9 1 Since the
foregoing factors proved determinative,9 2 the Transamerica Court did not
address the fourth Cort factor.93 Determining whether an adequate state
remedy exists, however, remains a part of the modified Cort test if the
statute meets the preceding factors." The Transamerica decision, there-
history of a statute to determine whether Congress intended to provide a private remedy.
See text accompanying note 64 supra. The Cort-Transamerica test, however, examines the
express language and historical sources of a statute to ascertain congressional intent. 444
U.S. at 16-22.
87 Id. at 23-24. The Transamerica Court reasoned that if the language and legislative
history reflect negatively on the implication issue, the inquiry is at an end. Id. The Court
examined the texts of §§ 206 and 215 and concluded that the language of § 215 fairly im-
plies a private right of action for a void contract. Id. at 17-18. The language of § 206, how-
ever, simply proscribes certain conduct and does not create civil liabilities. Id. at 19. The
Court recognized that the legislative history of the Advisers Act failed to consider private
rights. Id. at 18. Congressional intent, the Court reasoned, may be implicit in the structure
of the statute or the circumstances of its enactment. Id.; see Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1977); note 89 infra.
444 U.S. at 23-24.
89 Id. at 17-20. See also note 85 supra.
"Id. at 17-20. The Transamerica Court observed that Congress intended §§ 206 and
215 to benefit the clients of investment advisers. Id. at 17. Section 215 confers protection
particularly to parties to advisory contracts. Id. at 18-19. In light of implicit congressional
intent to protect parties to invalid advisory contracts, the Supreme Court upheld an implied
private right under § 215. Id. at 19. In contrast to § 215, § 206 simply establishes federal
fiduciary standards to govern the conduct of investment advisers. Id. at 19. Section 206,
therefore, protects no special class of investors. The Advisers Act provides only government
enforcement of § 206, see note 88 supra, unlike other federal securities laws that contain
express private remedies. 444 U.S. at 20-22. The lack of private remedies, the Court rea-
soned, is strong evidence of congressional unwillingness to include a private right of action
under § 206 within the legislative scheme of the Advisers Act. Id. at 21-22.
9' Id. at 23-24.
92 Id.
93 Id. The plaintiffs in Transamerica argued that the Cort test required consideration
of the fourth Cort factor in addition to determination of congressional intent. Id. The Tran-
samerica Court rejected this argument and reiterated that the Cort factors are not of equal
weight. Id. Citing Redington, the Court held that a determination that congressional intent
to imply a private right is absent will preclude further inquiry. Id. at 24.
' The Transamerica and Redington Courts were careful to avoid overruling Cort. Red-
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fore, reorders and redefines the original Cort factors to create a more re-
strictive implication test.
Applying the Cort-Transamerica test to section 17(a) involves a
threshold determination whether Congress intended to create private
rights thereunder. The initial level of inquiry, therefore, examines the ex-
press language and legislative history of section 17(a).95 The language of
section 17(a) limits its protective scope to frauds committed in the con-
text of an offer or sale of securities.96 Section 17(a)(1) disallows employ-
ment of dedeptive schemes in securities transactions.97 The language of
section 17(a)(1), however, confers no special rights on any group of inves-
tors. Similarly, the text of section 17(a)(2) fails to create any civil liabili-
ties, although that subsection generally proscribes misstatements and
omissions.9 8 Subsection (3) of section 17(a) forbids conduct that might
"operate as a fraud upon the purchasers." ' Since section 17(a)(3) makes
specific reference to purchasers, subsection (3) appears to identify pur-
chasers as a special class. 100 The text of subsection (3), however, simply
describes the object of fraudulent conduct without providing for civil lia-
bility.101 The express language of section 17(a), therefore, does not create
any private rights thereunder.102
The holding in Transamerica supports this conclusion.103 The lan-
ington held that the Cort factors are not of equal weight. 442 U.S. at 575. Similarly, the
Transamerica Court avoided foreclosing consideration of the fourth Cort factor. If congres-
sional intent fails to support a private right, denial of implied private rights results. See
note 93 supra. If the traditional indicia of legislative intent support implication of a private
remedy, however, the Transamerica analysis does not prevent examination of state
remedies.
" See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
" See 3 Loss, supra note 15, at 1785; note 7 supra.
" See note 7 supra. Some courts maintain that the language of § 17(a)(1) is broad
enough to support a private right of action based on common law fraud. See, e.g., Daniel v.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1245 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 439
U.S. 551 (1979); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973). The Supreme
Court, however, held that violation of a federal statute and injury to a person does not give
rise automatically to an implied right in favor of that person. See Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
IS See Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 155 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); note 7 supra. Some courts permit private actions under §
17(a)(2) if the procedural requirements of § 12(2) are met. See Wulc v. Gulf & Western
Indus., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 99, 103 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F.
Supp. 1089, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1972); see text accompanying notes 128-31 infra.
" See note 7 supra.
0 See Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275, 279 (D. Alaska 1979). But see
United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773-74 (1979). The Supreme Court recently inter-
preted § 17(a)(3) as referring to the impact fraudulent conduct may have on a purchaser. Id.
101 See id.
102 See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
10 Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(1), 77q(3) (1976) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1), 80b-6(2)
(1976). Sections 17(a)(1) and 206(1) prohibit the use of any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud. Sections 17(a)(3) and 206(2) forbid engaging in a transaction, practice, or course of
business that operates as a fraud or deceit upon a purchaser or a client of an investment
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guage of section 17(a)(1) and (3) is virtually identical to that of section
206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act.'" The Transamerica Court's determi-
nation that the language of section 206 fails to provide private rights logi-
cally extends to the language of section 17(a). An interpretation of the
language of section 17(a)(1) and (3) under Transamerica, therefore, mili-
tates against implying private rights under those subsections.
The language of section 17(a), however, is not the sole determinative
factor in the Cort-Transamerica implication analysis. The initial inquiry
under Cort-Transamerica also examines the historical sources behind sec-
tion 17(a). 1 5 The legislative history of section 17(a) reveals that Congress
enacted section 17(a) in 1933 and has made no subsequent amend-
ments.' ° 6 Each subsection, therefore, shares the same historical source.
The meagre legislative history behind section 17(a) fails to address the
issue of private rights.1 0 7 There is no indication, however, that Congress
contemplated private enforcement of section 17(a).10 8 In the face of legis-
lative silence behind section 206, the Transamerica Court was reluctant
to imply private rights where the plain language of section 206 does not
provide for implication."0 9 Similarly, neither the legislative history nor the
express language of section 17(a), therefore, support private rights of ac-
tion. Thus, if the Supreme Court refused to imply private rights under
section 206 in Transamerica, the Court will also refuse to imply private
rights under section 17(a). Since the first level of the Cort-Transamerica
test remains unsatisfied, the implication inquiry ordinarily would end
with a denial of private rights under section 17(a). Although traditional
implication analysis would examine the first, third, and fourth elements
of the Cort test, the Cort-Transamerica test would consider the remain-
ing modified Cort factors only if the statute satisfies the threshold
inquiry.
The second Cort-Transamerica inquiry reinforces the denial of pri-
vate rights under the examination of the language and legislative history
of section 17(a). The second step in the Cort-Transamerica implication
analysis identifies the beneficiaries and the purpose of section 17(a). The
Supreme Court recently held that the general purpose of section 17(a) is
to protect investors and securities market mechanisms from fraudulent
practices. 10 As a broad antifraud provision, section 17(a) does not benefit
adviser, respectively.
104 See text accompanying note 86 supra.
101 The only amendment to § 17(a) inserted "offer or" before the word "sale" in the
introductory paragraph. Act of Aug. 10, 1954, Title I, § 10, 68 Stat. 686. The amendment
redefined the term "sale" to distinguish between offers and sales. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3)
(1976).
100 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933); S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1933). See also Scienter and Section 17(a), supra note 11, at 1258-60.
107 See 3 Loss, supra note 15, at 1785-86.
1" 444 U.S. at 19-21.
109 See text accompanying note 87 supra.
110 United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 771-72 (1979).
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a special class, but rather the investing public in general.,1 Even assum-
ing investors and financial intermediaries protected by section 17(a) con-
stitute a special class, " 2 Transamerica nonetheless held that protection
of a particular class is insufficient to support a private cause of action
without evidence of congressional intent to do so."'
Congress drafted section 17(a) to prohibit frauds in the offer or sale of
securities. 1 4 Thus, offerees and purchasers frequently claim to be special
classes receiving the benefit of section 17(a) protection.115 The "offer or
sale" language describes the type of proscribed activities, instead of the
particular persons affected by the fraud." 6 Purchasers and offerees re-
ceive antifraud protection as a result of government enforcement 6f the
salutary purpose of section 17(a).
1 1 7
In conjunction with the statutory purpose determination, the Cort-
Transamerica analysis considers whether a private cause of action is nec-
essary to effectuate the purpose of section 17(a).11s The close relationship
between the '33 and '34 Acts requires the examination of alternatives for
investor redress under both Acts." 9 Congress drafted section 10(b), filling
the gap in protection afforded by section 17(a), to prohibit fraudulent
practices in the sale or purchase of securities. 20 The antifraud purposes
of sections 10(b) and 17(a), therefore, are similar. Neither section, how-
ever, provides an express private right.'2 In light of the private remedies
", Id. at 772-77.
, See id. at 772; text accompanying notes 43-48 supra.
112 444 U.S. at 23-25; see text accompanying note 91 supra.
11, See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1933).
"' See, e.g., Reid v. Madison, 438 F. Supp. 332, 335 (E.D. Va. 1977) (non-purchaser has
standing to assert implied remedy under § 17(a)); accord, Bosse v. Crowell, Collier & Mac-
Millan, 565 F.2d 602, 610 n.12 (9th Cir. 1977) (dicta). See generally Hazen, supra note 25,
at 659-66.
"I See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773 (1969). In Naftalin, the Supreme
Court interpreted the "offer or sale" phrase in § 17(a) to determine the ambit of § 17(a)
antifraud protection. Id. The Court held that this phrase refers to frauds in the context of
an offer or sale, rather than to the victim of the fraudulent behavior. Id.
Denial of implied rights under § 17(a) in favor of offerees receives support from the
Supreme Court decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Blue Chip held that offerees lack standing to assert implied rights under Rule 10b-5. Id. at
755. Implication of private rights for offerees, the Court observed, would increase vexatious
litigation, difficulty in proving injury, and excessive awards for damages. Id. at 739-49. Fur-
thermore, the Court regarded the express remedies contained in §§ 11 and 12 of the '33 Act
as ample evidence that Congress did not wish to extend private rights to non-purchasing
offerees for lost investment opportunities. Id. at 754.
'1, See notes 3 & 4 supra.
118 See text accompanying note 90 supra.
"' See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 727-30 (1975); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453,
466 (1969).
120 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1934); see Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-51 (1972); E. GADSBY, 11A BusINESS ORGAIZTMONS §
5.02(3), at 20 n.27 (1979) [hereinafter cited as GADsBY].
", Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (1976) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2), 78i(e),
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afforded purchasers and sellers, Congress conceivably did not anticipate
private enforcement of sections 10(b) or 17(a).122 Courts clearly recognize
implied private rights under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder. 2 3 The texts of Rule 10b-5 and sections 17(a)(1) and (3), how-
ever, are nearly identical. 124 Defrauded purchasers and sellers, upon proof
of scienter, may proceed under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." 5 Private
enforcement of negligent violations of section 17(a) creates a remedy con-
siderably broader in scope than under section 10(b).12s Private remedies
for wilfull violations of sections 17(a)(1) and (3) duplicate private means
for redress under section 10(b).127 Implication of private rights under sec-
tions 17(a)(1) and (3) undercuts the regulatory scheme envisioned by
Congress and, therefore, is unnecessary to effectuate the protective pur-
pose of the '33 and '34 Acts.
The '33 Act creates express civil liabilities under two statutes protect-
ing purchasers. Section 12(2) protects purchasers from misstatements or
omissions in written or oral communications.1 2 Similarly, section 11 pro-
hibits falsehoods and omissions in the registration statement.129 Both sec-
tions specifically confer private rights upon purchasers, although each
provision contains strict procedural requirements.1 0 Section 17(a)(2),
78p(b), 78r(a) (1976).
2 See note 3 supra.
'23The first case to imply private rights under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Twenty-five years later, the Su-
preme Court confirmed the overwhelming consensus among lower courts that these private
rights exist. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
124 Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(1), 77q(a)(3) (1976) with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 under § 10(b) and extended the language of § 17(a) to
apply to purchases and sales. GAnsBy, supra note 120, § 5.04(1) at 30. Section 17(a), how-
ever, does not contain the phrase "manipulative or deceptive device" found in § 10(b). Un-
like Rule 10b-5 claims, state and federal courts have jurisdiction over § 17(a) actions. See 15
U.S.C. § 77v (1976).
125 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
1I6 See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 795 (7th Cir. 1977); Valles Salgado
v. Piedmont Capital Corp., 452 F. Supp. 853, 858 (D.P.R. 1978); Malik v. Universal Re-
sources Corp., 425 F. Supp. 350, 363 (S.D. Cal. 1976). The Redington decision asserted the
Court's reluctance to imply a cause of action that is significantly broader than the remedies
Congress chose to provide. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979). See
Steinburg, supra note 34, at 181.
I But see Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287, 1292 (7th Cir.
1975) (remedies provided by § 10(b) and other sections of '34 Act are cumulative rather
than mutually exclusive); Hazen, supra note 25, at 658.
128 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2) (1976).
120 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
11' Sections 11 and 12(2) are subject to the statute of limitations contained in § 13. See
15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976). Actions brought under §§ 11 and 12(2) must commence within one
year from the date of discovery of the misleading nature of a statement or after the discov-
ery should have been made by exercise of reasonable minds. Id. Section 11 claims fail if
brought three years after the public offering, while § 12(2) claims fail if brought three years
after the sale of a security. Id. A court may assess court costs and attorneys' fees against
either party. 15 U.S.C. § 17k(e) (1976); see GAnsBY, supra note 120, § 5.02(2) at 11. Sections
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however, prohibits the same type of conduct as would sections 11 and
12(2) if stripped of their procedural safeguards. 31 A private remedy
under section 17(a)(2) would, therefore, duplicate existing remedies and
nullify the limitations imposed by Congress. 1 32 Clearly, Congress did not
intend to emasculate the express remedies provided for private plaintiffs.
Since Congress expressly created such a remedy in section 12(2), the Su-
preme Court should be reluctant to imply a similar, but more expansive
remedy under section 17(a)(2)."'3 Implied private rights under section
17(a), therefore, are unnecessary to protect any special class and are in-
consistent with the congressional goal of safeguarding the securities mar-
ket and investors from fraud.
Although the purpose and scope of section 17(a) militate against im-
plication, consideration of the fourth Cort factor is the final level of in-
quiry under the Cort-Transamerica test. If a statute meets the first two
levels of inquiry, the modified implication test examines the statutory
remedy in light of state law. Transamerica, however, reorders the priority
and weight assigned to the original Cort factors."s' The least important
element of the Cort-Transamerica analysis is a determination whether
the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law.1 5 The na-
tional securities market is clearly an industry subject to the pervasive in-
fluence of federal securities laws."36 Federal legislative schemes regulate
securities market mechanisms and provide express private remedies for
securities violations.'" In light of the purpose and scope of federal securi-
ties laws, a private right of action for fraud in this context is not an area
traditionally relegated to state law." s The fourth Cort factor, therefore,
encourages implication under section 17(a). However, the most important
implication element, congressional intent, outweighs the state law consid-
erations and fails to support private rights under section 17(a).
In light of the Supreme Court's conservative approach to implying pri-
vate rights under federal securities laws, neither the narrow focus of the
Transamerica implication inquiry, nor the refusal to imply a private rem-
edy under an antifraud provision, is surprising. Although the Supreme
Court has not confronted the controversial issue whether an implied pri-
11 and 12(2) impose a negligence standard on the plaintiff. Id. at 11 & 15. In addition, §
12(2) contains a privity requirement and permits a plaintiff to sue only his immediate seller.
But see id. at 17 (liability imposed on agents, attorneys, and corporate officials not in privity
with purchaser).
131 See note 7 supra; text accompanying notes 128-30 supra. But see Hazen, supra note
25, at 644-45.
13' See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 1977); Wulc v. Gulf
& Western Indus., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 99, 103 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp.,
336 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
'3 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
13 See text accompanying notes 83-94 supra.
I" See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
136 See note 1 supra.
37 See text accompanying notes 1 & 3 supra.
138 See Steinberg, supra note 34, at 182.
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vate right of action exists under section 17(a) of the '33 Act, 39 the Tran-
samerica decision forecloses the implication of private rights under sec-
tion 17(a). The language and legislative history of section 17(a) do not
indicate any congressional intent to imply private rights."1 0 Section 17(a)
fails to meet the threshold inquiry of the Cort-Transamerica analysis,
and, therefore, does not support implication of private rights thereunder.
CAROLYN R. SAFFOLD-HEYWARD
"' See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 n.6 (1975).
10 See text accompanying notes 95-109 supra.
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